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 1. Introduction 
The distribution of shocks across prices, wages, and employment reactions is an essential element of 
microeconomic and macroeconomic adjustment. At microeconomic level, reactions to market-
originated shocks are shaped by structural features and by institutional constraints. In the labour 
market, collective bargaining privileges wage stability, and employment protection legislation aims at 
stabilising employment. Stable wages and stable employment are beneficial for uninsured workers, but 
labour market rigidity constrains labour (re)allocation reducing productivity and profits (see e.g. 
Bertola, 1999). Administrative and survey data are analysed from relevant perspectives by Guiso et al. 
(2005), Leonardi and Pica (2007), Cardoso and Portela (2009), and others. At the macroeconomic 
level, labour market rigidity prevents wage and employment changes from absorbing the impact of 
cost shocks, and makes it more difficult for monetary policy to achieve price stability as contractually 
pre-set wages anticipate future price increases. If labour markets are heavily regulated and weak 
product market competition endows firms with significant price-setting power, then (in the absence of 
appropriate economy-wide wage-setting coordination) energy prices and other supply shocks can 
easily trigger wage-price inflationary spirals.  
In this paper, we aim at obtaining novel insights on these important issues from the extensive firm-
level information collected in the framework of the Eurosystem’s Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) 
survey.1 This survey (documented in the Online Appendix) is suitable for the purpose of characterising 
how structural and institutional features of the firms’ environment shape price, employment, and wage 
adjustment. Its rich structure makes it possible not only to identify the persistence and commonality of 
hypothetical shocks, but also to relate the stated reaction strategies to self-reported and country-level 
features of the firm’s environment.  
We focus specifically on the intensity and the international character of output market competition, 
and on the incidence of collective-bargaining constraints on firm-level wages. We find that a 
significant (albeit small) proportion of the variation across countries and firms of price, wage, and 
employment adjustment strategies is empirically explained by structural and institutional features. 
Consistently with standard theoretical insights, product market competition reduces the relevance of 
price reactions to cost shocks, and cost adjustment is distributed across wage and employment 
reactions in ways that depend on the extent of firm-level wage flexibility and on the presence of 
temporary workers.  
Section 2 reviews aspects of the survey’s questions and structure that are relevant to the specific issues 
we address and to the interpretation of our results, and Section 3 outlines the theoretical considerations 
that motivate the empirical specifications. Section 4 investigates the influence of firms’ characteristics 
on the reported relevance of price and cost adjustments. Section 5 examines the survey’s evidence 
regarding preferred cost-adjustment strategies. In both cases, controlling for other relevant variables, 
the data offer robust evidence of the role of the structure of employment contracts (as regards their 
                                                 
1
 The WDN program, based at the European Central Bank in 2006-2009, coordinated the work of researchers 
from 24 European central banks. An Online Appendix documents the structure of the WDN Survey, and 
provides detailed information to readers interested in working on these issues and those of other papers in the 
same project.  
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permanent or temporary character, and the presence of flexible wage components) in shaping firms’ 
responses, and confirm that when product or labour markets are less competitive, then cost shocks 
spill-over more strongly into price or wage increases. Section 6 concludes discussing the arguably 
limited quantitative relevance and structural interpretation of some of the empirical correlations, and 
highlighting their implications for policy and further research. 
2. Data  
The survey asked firms for a qualitative assessment of their adjustment strategies in reaction to 
hypothetical shocks (the exact wording of the questionnaire is reported in the Online Appendix). 
Among these, we consider cost-push shocks affecting all firms in the market: an unanticipated 
increase in the cost of an intermediate input (for example, an oil price increase), and an unanticipated 
and permanent increase in wages (for example, due to the renewal of a national contract). The extent 
to which such shocks are passed through to prices, wages, and employment is clearly relevant to more 
general and topical macroeconomic issues, such as the consequences of oil-price increases like those 
observed in 2007-08 (when the survey was designed), as well as in previous and later episodes.2 
A total of 15,235 responses were obtained, from firms located in the 14 countries listed along the 
horizontal axis of Figure 1 and in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The summary statistics we report weigh 
the data so as to account for differences in sampling probabilities and non-response rates across 
observable characteristics of firms (see the Online Appendix for details).  
The respondents were asked to consider four different adjustment strategies in response to these 
shocks: an increase in prices; a reduction in profit margins; a reduction in output; and a reduction in 
costs. Each could be assessed as “very relevant,” “relevant,” “of little relevance,” or “not relevant.” 
There is clearly a lot of heterogeneity across countries as regards not only the character, but also the 
overall intensity of adjustment. In Figure 1, the countries are sorted according to the means of the four 
percentages, shown by the black lines, which range from more than 75 percent in Estonia to less than 
30 percent in Hungary. The bars in the figure show the percentage of firms that assign “very relevant” 
or “relevant” to the possible adjustment strategies. Moreover, Table 1 illustrates the average relevance 
of the four adjustment strategies across all countries. In response to a cost shock, approximately 70 
percent of the respondents indicate that a reduction of other costs and price increases are “very 
relevant” or “relevant” options. Fewer indicate that a reduction in profit margins is a relevant answer, 
and only 23 percent say that they reduce output. In response to an input-cost shock, about two thirds of 
all firms increase prices. Scoring the four-point relevance scale from 4 for “very relevant”, down to 1 
for “not relevant”, we see that reducing costs, increasing prices, and reducing profit margins are on 
average slightly less important after wage shocks than after other input-cost shocks.3 
                                                 
2
 Respondents were also asked about adjustment strategies in the aftermath of demand shocks. The resulting 
survey evidence is also highly relevant, particularly in the context of the 2008-09 recession, during which a 
follow-up survey was conducted. The resulting extended data set makes it possible (using methods similar to 
those of our paper) to study how structural and institutional features shape demand-shock reactions (Fabiani et 
al., 2011). 
 
3
 One might expect the relevance of different strategies for each firm to be consistent in simple ways: for 
example, firms that do not adjust prices or output should adjust margins, and price increases should accompany 
output reductions along a stable demand curve. Simple correlations, however, do not provide clear information 
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For our purposes, it is most interesting to see whether and how the intended cost reduction involves a 
reduction of labour input. The rich structure of the WDN survey makes it possible to explore this 
issue. Unless firms rate ‘cost reduction’ as completely irrelevant, respondents were in each case asked 
to indicate the main channel for cost reduction, choosing a single option among the six listed in Table 
2. About half of the firms choose one of the five ways to reduce labour costs; among these, three 
imply an employment response to a shock: in reaction to a shock, and without conditioning on any 
other variable, some 30 percent of the responding firms plan to implement their cost reductions by 
reducing the number of employees, and about 7 percent by reducing hours worked by employee. Only 
around 10 percent of the firms indicate that they are likely to reduce costs by cutting flexible wage 
components, and only about 2 percent would cut base wages, confirming a common finding in the 
literature (e.g. Bewley, 1999). The other half of the firms state that they would react to higher cost or 
wage costs by cutting other, non-labour costs. While this may simply reflect wishful thinking on the 
part of respondents, it may indeed be appropriate to engage in energy-saving reorganisation in the face 
of an oil price increase, and a wage-cost push may also induce firms to renegotiate input prices with 
suppliers of intermediate inputs, or to reduce administrative or advertising costs. 
3. Theory  
We bring to bear on these data a partial equilibrium perspective on firms’ optimal employment 
strategies, focusing on the interaction between shocks and price, employment, and wage adjustment. 
We assume a “right to manage” situation, where employment and hours are chosen by firms (possibly 
subject to hiring and firing costs), while wages may be bargained collectively. In that setting, the 
relevance of price and cost reactions depends on the shape of the firm’s marginal revenues and 
marginal productivity (hence marginal costs). In turn, these depend on the firm’s market power, and 
on institutional constraints on wage and employment adjustment. Similar insights would also be 
relevant, if employment were an element of collective bargains, or in competitive frameworks where 
shocks (especially when they are common to the industry) are associated with wage changes along 
local labour supply curves.  
As wages and other costs vary, firms’ choices are constrained by the costs and market consequences of 
price adjustments. When prices are flexible, firms move along the product demand curve, and 
employers should choose employment so as to equate the wage to labour’s marginal impact on firm’s 
revenues. For a perfectly competitive firm with flexible prices, this is labour’s marginal productivity, 
multiplied by the product’s price. For a firm with market power, it is the marginal revenue product. 
Under flexible prices, margins may be adjusted, if the elasticity of demand is variable; as in Gali 
(1994), the resulting feedback from output quantities to prices in a multi-sector economy can generate 
self-fulfilling multiple dynamic equilibria. This, however, may not be the most relevant theoretical 
framework for the purpose of interpreting the surveyed firms’ attitude towards various adjustments to 
cost shocks, and to assess their relevance for the cost-wage-spiral issues that motivate our research. 
We will instead frame our simple theoretical considerations in terms of the standard setting of modern 
New Keynesian macroeconomic models, where “sticky” prices change infrequently because nominal 
                                                                                                                                                        
in these respects, as each firm was allowed to consider all or none of the alternatives as more or less relevant and 
presumably did so in light of its own circumstances. Depending on the perceived demand elasticity, for example, 
output and price changes are more or less relevant in relation to each other. The controlled regressions we report 
below offer more interpretable results. 
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price variation is costly and firms can keep prices fixed in response to cost shocks because their pre-set 
prices are higher than marginal costs.  
The survey does not offer quantitative information on the size of desired or actual price changes, 
which in the relevant theoretical models depend on expectations as well as on current marginal cost 
changes. The survey does, however, offer qualitative information as to the relevance, and perhaps the 
likelihood, of price adjustment as a response to shocks for each firm. If prices do not change but costs 
do, then margins need to be adjusted. Thus, the relative relevance of ‘increase prices’ and ‘reduce 
output’ should depend on the extent of price stickiness. As shown by Ball and Romer (1990), real 
rigidities (i.e., restraints on the variability of relative prices) reduce firm-level incentives to change 
nominal prices when doing so entails “menu” costs. While Ball and Romer focus on the equilibrium 
implications of demand shocks, much the same mechanism is at work in our survey’s firm-level 
reactions to cost shocks. 
In response to supply shocks that (like those mentioned in the survey questions) are common to all 
firms, when the output market is more competitive then price changes should be more relevant than 
other reactions. In the limit case of perfect competition, prices are equal to marginal costs and would 
necessarily change when wages or other input costs are shocked. A lower elasticity of product demand 
implies larger margins and, for a given cost of changing prices, makes price rigidity a more likely 
outcome. Conversely, high elasticity of product demand and small margins make “real” rigidity less 
relevant, and make it easier for wage and cost shocks to overcome the cost of price changes.  
As regards to strategies other than price changes, it is particularly interesting and insightful to focus on 
how wage and employment reactions may depend on the structural and institutional features of the 
firms’ business environment in which choices are made. As outlined formally in the Appendix, the 
relevance of employment and wage reactions depends on the elasticity of labour demand and on 
institutional constraints.  
Both wage and employment responses are expected to be larger when labour demand is more elastic, 
which in turn reflects substitutability of labour with other factors of production (suggesting that 
empirical analysis should account for technological features) as well as the intensity of product market 
competition. International economic integration is a particularly plausible source of both 
substitutability and competition: when a firm’s production and investment choice spans international 
borders, the elasticity of labour demand is expected to be larger (see Andersen and Skaksen, 2007, and 
references therein), and firms are expected to try hard to reduce costs. Whether they can do so through 
wage and/or employment adjustment (rather than through a catch-all ‘other cost reduction’ strategy) 
should depend on the labour intensity of their production structure.  
In a dynamic environment, wages and employment need not vary along the static labour demand curve 
(see e.g. Bertola, 1999). Employment protection legislation can muffle employment variation in the 
aftermath of shocks. The ability of wages to respond to firm-level and common shocks depends on 
institutional features as well as on local labour market conditions, along the lines of e.g. Topel (1986), 
especially when labour mobility is low. Employment adjustment should be larger when wages are 
rigid, and smaller when turnover is more costly (Bertola and Rogerson, 1997). Thus, the wage and 
employment components of cost-reduction responses in our empirical specification will be allowed to 
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depend on firms’ institutional environment in terms of both wage-bargaining institutions and 
employment flexibility. In this respect, the survey provides useful information as to the prevalence of 
temporary work and the level of wage bargaining.  
As regards the cost-cutting choices of Table 2, these simple theoretical considerations suggest that 
wage and employment responses should be stronger when firms are subject to strong product market 
competition, but weaker when collective agreements reduce wage flexibility and employment 
protection legislation (or non-availability of temporary contracts, or technological features) reduces 
employment flexibility. The relevance of each reaction channel is obviously related to that of other 
possible reactions for each firm: a firm’s propensity to adjust costs rather than prices, of course, 
depends on how easy it is in practice to do so. Thus, cost-related characteristics are relevant for the 
previous choice between price and cost adjustments. In what follows, we examine the two stages of 
the firms’ survey replies, combining firm-level and country-level information about relevant features 
of the firms’ environment, without modelling formally the relationship between them.4  
4. Price and cost adjustment 
We focus on the two most popular adjustment strategies in Table 1: reducing costs and increasing 
prices. In theory, the choice of adjustment strategy is dictated by firms’ marginal revenue and cost 
considerations. Though these are not observed, some of the variables available in the WDN survey 
dataset can be used to capture certain characteristics of firms’ marginal revenue and cost schedules 
indirectly.  
We are particularly interested in whether cost reduction is a more relevant adjustment strategy than 
price adjustment for firms that behave as price takers rather than price makers. The variable 
competition is a dummy variable coded as unity if the firm replies that it would be “very likely” to 
decrease the price of its product in case the firm’s main competitor reduced its price (and as zero if 
“likely,” “not likely,” “not at all,” and “do not know/does not apply” was indicated by the firm).5 The 
share of foreign sales in a firm’s revenues can also proxy for the intensity of price competition, since 
(controlling for sector and size) firms that are more exposed to large international markets should 
enjoy less market power.  
To account for differences in production technologies and labour intensities across firms, our 
specifications also include: labour share – the share of labour costs in total costs; the sector in which 
the firm operates (seven NACE-based sector dummies for manufacturing, energy, construction, trade, 
market services, financial intermediation and non-market services); and firm size (a set of four dummy 
variables indicating whether the firm’s employment falls in the 5-19, 20-49, 50-199, 200+ intervals).  
                                                 
4
 In principle, the character of a firm’s product market should determine whether costs rather than prices are 
adjusted, and should not be directly relevant for cost-adjustment strategies. We have considered an explicit two-
stage estimation procedure, whereby the predicted probability of cost-adjustment relevance is included in the 
cost-adjustment specifications, to control for sample selection. In practice, however, selection of firms into the 
sample that identifies a main cost-reduction strategy appears to be driven by the survey’s structure rather than by 
product-market competition indicators. 
5
 We recoded answers to the slightly different question asked in the Dutch survey so as to recover analogous 
information. 
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While the choice of price adjustment as a shock-reaction strategy is shaped importantly by product 
market characteristics, the relevance of cost adjustment depends in theory on how easy it is to do so. 
This depends on rigidities and adjustment costs in the labour market. In this respect, the WDN survey 
dataset offers a number of variables that can be regarded as indirect measures of rigidities and 
adjustment costs associated with the labour input. To account for wage rigidities, our set of 
explanatory variables includes collective agreement, higher level – a dummy variable showing 
whether a given firm adopts a collective agreement concluded at national, regional, sectoral or 
occupational level, and collective agreement, firm level – a dummy variable indicating the presence of 
collective bargaining at the level of the firm.  
Finally, our estimations include a set of country-specific dummies to account for unobserved national 
effects, such as those that might arise from country-specific employment protection legislation. Table 
A.1 in the Appendix reports basic summary statistics for the covariates; fewer than the total of 15,235 
surveyed firms are included in the regressions, because many declined to answer specific questions. 
Irish firms are only included for cost shocks, because that country-specific questionnaire did not 
include wage-shock questions.  
We explore the determinants of firms’ choice to increase prices and/or lower costs in response to cost-
push shocks by focusing on one of these adjustment strategies at a time. As already described in 
Section 2, firms could indicate the importance of each strategy in their packages of measures by telling 
us whether a given margin of adjustment is “very relevant,” “relevant,” “of little relevance” and “not 
relevant”. On the basis of this information, we define the endogenous variables as dummies, which are 
equal to unity if the adjustment strategy in question is “very relevant” or “relevant”, and zero 
otherwise. Thus, we model the determinants of price increase and cost-cutting decisions by estimating 
probit models in the form ( )xY β ′Φ== )1(Prob  where β is a vector of coefficients, x is a vector of 
explanatory variables, and Φ(.) denotes the cumulative normal distribution function.  
As shown in Figure 1, the sample is very heterogeneous across countries. Thus, we use regressions 
with country dummies. It may be of particular interest, however, to additionally assess whether slope 
coefficients differ across two groups of countries that may be heterogeneous across sensible and 
policy-relevant dimensions: the older members of the EU, which in our sample have all adopted the 
single currency, and the new Central and Eastern European members that have not yet entered the euro 
area. Thus, we report the coefficient of interactions with a Non-EA dummy that equals unity for firms 
located in countries that, at the time of the survey, were outside the euro area: Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland. We are mainly interested in its interaction with two variables: 
the share of labour costs in total costs, representing an important feature of firms’ production 
functions, and the share of foreign sales, an important feature of firms’ market conditions. The latter 
variable’s association with firms’ reaction strategies may reasonably differ between euro area and non 
euro-area countries. Firms in non-euro area countries are exposed to potentially floating exchange 
rates and, in light of the countries’ recent accession to the EU and less advanced economic 
development, may specialise in production stages where international markets are more competitive. 
The regressions reported in Table 3 explain the probability that a price increase or a cost reduction is a 
“very relevant” or “relevant” strategy in reaction to wage and cost shocks. The coefficients measure 
the probability impact of a unit change of each covariate (from zero to one in the case of dummy 
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variables), in terms of average probit marginal effects; the size of this average (over all the sample) 
marginal effect and its significance do not differ substantially from those computed for a firm for 
which all model covariates are set at their average values. To economise on space, some of the less 
relevant estimates are not reported. The bottom row of the table reports the predicted probability for 
that firm to report that the response to a shock is “relevant” or “very relevant”.  
Stronger competition is associated with more intensive adjustment in (other) costs in the aftermath of 
supply shocks. A firm in a very competitive environment is 3.8 p.p. more likely to reduce costs after a 
cost shock and 2.9 p.p. after a wage shock. Reciprocally, price increases are less likely when 
competition in the product market is strong, though this effect is statistically significant only for the 
wage shock. Qualitatively, however, competition has the same effect on firms’ adjustment to both 
shocks: it makes firms more likely to reduce costs, but less likely to increase prices, as suggested by 
our theoretical considerations in Section 3.  
The share of foreign sales in total sales, another indicator of competitive pressure, also appears to 
matter for the way firms react to cost-push shocks. Specifically, we find that firms with a higher 
exposure to foreign product markets are more likely to respond to cost shocks by lowering other costs. 
In this regard, exposure to foreign markets implies a qualitatively similar effect to that of our more 
direct measure of price competition. Since the hypothetical wage shock is common to other firms but 
country-specific, it is similarly sensible to find that a higher share of foreign sales in total sales reduces 
the relevance of output price increases as a response to it.  
Firms covered by collective agreements at higher level are more likely to respond to shocks by 
increasing prices; collective agreements at the firm level do not seem to have strong independent 
effects on price and cost adjustment. Marginal cost rigidities stemming from the presence of higher 
level collective agreements increase the likelihood that cost shocks and wage shocks will be passed 
through to product prices by 2.5 p.p. and 3.9 p.p., respectively.  
A firm’s production technology also affects the way it reacts to shocks. According to Table 3, a higher 
labour cost share lowers the likelihood of price adjustment after a cost shock (a 10 p.p. rise in the 
labour share lowers the incidence of price adjustment by about 1 p.p.). The marginal costs of firms 
using labour input more intensively are bound to be less sensitive to changes in the cost of 
intermediate inputs, reducing the need to adjust product prices in response to the input-cost shock. 
Since a higher labour share implies that marginal costs are more sensitive to labour costs, prices are 
more likely to be raised in response to a general wage increase. This is also consistent with the results 
obtained focusing on price determinants within the Inflation Persistence Network (see Fabiani et al., 
2006). 
As regards the interaction terms with dummies that identify firms located in non-euro area (and, in our 
sample, recent EU member) countries, a significant difference seems to be that such firms are less 
likely to increase prices after a supply shock when they have a high exposure to foreign markets. This 
may be explained by the fact that, in those countries, the firms’ market environment is more 
competitive over and beyond what is captured by observable indicators. 
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The specifications of Table 3 include country dummies. Their estimated coefficients (not reported in 
the table) are sizeable and highly significant; in the case of a wage shock, the difference between the 
largest (Estonia) and smallest (Hungary) country effect contributes almost 60 percentage points to the 
probability of price adjustment: much of the variation in firms’ adjustment to shocks is accounted for 
by national factors after controlling for a rather extensive set of firm-specific characteristics.6  
These country-specific effects may reflect country-specific institutional characteristics. Table 4 shows 
how the country dummy coefficients in the four specifications of Table 3 correlate with an 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator.7 The correlation is positive and strong when the 
coefficients reflect the relevance of price increases as reactions to cost shocks and essentially zero 
when the dependent variable is the relevance of other cost reductions. Taken at face value, this 
indicates that price increases are more likely in the aftermath of a cost shock (such as an increase of oil 
prices) in countries with higher employment protection. In the wage shock scenario, however, 
correlations are not significantly different from zero. This evidence, of course, can only be suggestive, 
because only a small number of observations are available and many other institutional features, such 
as product market regulation, covary with EPL along the cross-country dimension.  
The specifications of Table 3 also include sector and firm-size controls. We find that firms operating 
in the market services sector attach less relevance to adjustment strategies than manufacturing firms in 
the case of both input-cost and wage shocks, with a notable exception: the relevance of price increases 
in reaction to a permanent increase in wages is similar across services and manufacturing firms. As 
regards firm size, we find that larger firms are more likely to emphasise the importance of the “cutting 
other costs” adjustment strategy. 
5. Cost-cutting strategies 
To determine factors explaining the choice of the most important cost-cutting strategy (see Table 2 for 
the different cost-cutting strategies firms could choose from), we run a set of probit regressions 
relating each adjustment choice to theoretically relevant covariates. In particular, we focus on 
indicators of product market structure and labour market institutions. The dependent variable in the 
probit regression equals one if the firm indicates that the respective cost-cutting strategy is the most 
important one, and zero otherwise. Besides the covariates considered in Section 4, we include share of 
temporary employment, measured as the percent share of employees with a temporary contract; share 
of part-time employment, the percent share of employees that work part-time on a permanent contract, 
and share of variable wages, the percent share of the total wage bill that corresponds to bonuses and 
benefits that depend on individual or firm performance. 
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of probit regressions relating the choice of a main cost adjustment 
strategy, in reaction to cost and wage shocks, to indicators of product market competition (competition 
and share of foreign sales), of the firm’s technology (labour share), of the structure of the workforce 
                                                 
6
 In  linear regressions, some 85-95 percent of the variation in the relevance scores is explained by country 
dummies rather than by firm-specific covariates. This may reflect differences in language and survey-taking 
technique, as well as the institutional features we discuss in the text. 
7
 We use EPL indicators based on the standard OECD definition, as updated and extended by Tonin (2005) to 
new member states.  
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and of its remuneration (share of temporary and part-time employment as well as share of variable 
wages), and of wage-bargaining features (collective agreement, firm level; collective agreement, 
higher level). All specifications again include country, industry, and size dummies in order to control 
for institutional (and other) country-specific factors and for unobserved technological and market-
structure differences across sectors and firms of different sizes.  
In both Tables 5 and 6, product market competition is positively associated with the relevance of 
employment and wage adjustment after both types of shocks. For a given degree of wage rigidity, this 
is consistent with standard labour demand theory, in that, for a given labour share, a more elastic 
product demand function implies a more elastic labour demand and a more pressing need for firms to 
reduce employment. This result is similar for permanent and temporary employment. Also flexible 
wage adjustment is more likely in a highly competitive environment8. As shown in Tables 5 and 6, the 
main impact of competition is on the choice between labour and non-labour costs. These costs could 
include, for instance, advertising, marketing and other costs that in a competitive environment should 
be minimised even without a negative shock.9 Firms operating in a highly competitive environment are 
thus less likely to reduce non-labour costs and more likely to reduce labour costs, regardless which 
type of labour costs.  
Regarding wage-setting institutions, we find that collective agreements outside the firm, that is 
collective agreements signed at the national, regional, sectoral or occupational level, make an 
adjustment of temporary employment more likely. Imposing a wage agreement negotiated at a higher 
than the firm level to a firm increases the probability of laying-off temporary workers by 
approximately 4 p.p. Furthermore, there is a tendency for wages to be stickier when there are 
collective wage agreements present. Thus, firms covered by collective wage agreements appear to 
reduce the number of temporary employees (and not the number of permanent employees) due to wage 
rigidity. It should be noted that country dummies are included in our regressions, already capturing 
national-specific characteristics of collective bargaining institutions. 
The share of temporary workers features a relatively strong association with the character of cost-
cutting strategies. Firms with a high share of temporary employment are more likely to indicate layoffs 
of temporary employees as the preferred adjustment strategy, and less likely to reduce the number of 
permanent employees and flexible wages (as well as to try and decrease non-labour costs). An increase 
in the share of temporary workers by 10 percentage points increases the probability of cutting 
temporary employment by 1.4 p.p.. Thus, temporary employment acts as a buffer against employment 
fluctuations for permanent workers and against wage fluctuations.  
Since employment protection legislation should in theory influence cost-reduction strategies, we again 
inspect the relationship between EPL indicators and the country dummy coefficients that in the 
regressions absorb these and other national characteristics. Figure 2 shows that country effects 
                                                 
8
 The frequency of base wage adjustment is too low to allow for a proper estimation of its determinants. The 
results are very similar if the very few firms that report base wage adjustment as their main cost adjustment 
strategy are pooled with those that choose flexible wage components.  
9
 We also estimated a multinomial model, obtaining similar results. The intensity of competition appears to 
influence the choice between non-labour cost and labour cost adjustment more strongly than that between 
different labour cost adjustment strategies.  
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estimated in the permanent employment adjustment regressions are negatively correlated with the 
degree of EPL strictness for regular workers (-0.34). Thus, EPL works as intended: it protects 
permanent employees. In the case of temporary employment, the relationship between EPL and 
country effects is weaker, and positive as shown in Figure 3. While the evidence can only be 
suggestive, it unsurprisingly indicates that stricter employment protection for regular workers induces 
firms to lay off temporary workers when costs need to be reduced.  
Among the other variables included in our regressions, the labour share deserves to be discussed 
briefly. We see in Tables 5 and 6 that a large labour share is positively associated with the choice of 
the flexible wage cost-adjustment option. Analysing another portion of the WDN survey, Babecký et 
al. (2009) document that non-euro area firms are more likely to have access to flexible wage 
adjustment mechanisms, such as bonuses, and that this and other adjustment margins are more 
commonly used by firms that are subject to (nominal) base wage rigidities and that tend to feature a 
smaller share of blue-collar workers. In our regressions, the wage rigidity implied by higher-level 
wage agreements implies that temporary employment bears the brunt of adjustment, while a larger 
share of variable wage costs tends to stabilise both temporary and permanent employment making 
wage adjustment the preferred reaction to all types of cost-push shocks. Interactions with non-euro 
area dummies are not significant as regards flexible-wage adjustment. Outside the euro area, labour 
intensity is associated with a significantly higher incidence of permanent employment reactions to 
cost-push shocks, and this may well reflect the more flexible lay-off arrangements of less heavily 
regulated markets. 
6. Conclusions 
Empirical evidence from the WDN survey highlights several theoretically sensible features of price, 
wage and employment reactions to changes in the economic environment for numerous European 
countries. Firms that report facing strong competition in the product market or export much of their 
production are less likely to increase prices, and more likely to reduce costs after a wage shock (stated 
in the survey question to be common to all firms in the industry). The presence of collective wage 
agreements at industry or national level makes a price increase more likely. The data also suggest that 
price increases are more likely where employment protection legislation is more stringent. When 
reducing costs, firms operating in a highly competitive environment are less likely to reduce non-
labour costs and more likely to reduce labour costs. The latter is less likely to be accomplished by 
wage reductions when firms are subject to labour contracts signed at higher bargaining levels, which 
induce firms to react to cost shocks by reducing employment and especially temporary employment, in 
particular when permanent employees are protected from dismissal.  
The quantitative magnitude of these statistically significant estimates is difficult to assess, both 
because they refer to the subjective “relevance” of different strategies, and because much of the 
variation observed remains unexplained (or is explained by country effects) after accounting for 
heterogeneity in directly observable firm-level characteristics. Counterfactual experiments, such as 
imputation to individual countries or sectors of different countries’ or sectors’ observed average levels 
of competition, predict rather small changes in the proportion of survey responses falling in each 
“relevance” category. 
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Arguably, however, the observed relationship between shock responses and institutional or structural 
variables suggests that the long phase of macroeconomic stability that accompanied European 
economic and monetary unification may have been fostered by stronger product market competition, 
within and across countries’ borders, as well as by labour market deregulation. Our results suggest that 
these developments should have had important implications for inflation transmission mechanisms, 
and should have made it easier for a rule-based and credible policy framework to foster 
macroeconomic stability. It will be important for future research to study the evolution of these  
mechanisms in the aftermath of the Great Recession. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of firms assigning “very relevant” or “relevant” to each adjustment strategy 
after a cost shock, by country 
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Figure 2. Correlation between EPL for permanent employment (vertical axis) and country dummy 
coefficients in probit regressions for “adjustment of permanent employment” as the main cost-
reduction strategy after a cost shock (first column of Table 5) 
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Figure 3. Correlation between EPL for permanent employment (vertical axis) and country dummy 
coefficients in probit regressions for “adjustment of temporary employment” as the main cost-
reduction strategy after a cost shock (second column of Table 5). 
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Table 1. Reactions after cost shocks and after wage shocks 
Adjustment strategy after a cost shock after a wage shock 
 Average * Relevant or  
very relevant 
Average * Relevant or  
very relevant 
Reduce costs 2.88 70.95% 2.69 62.14% 
Increase prices 2.80 68.07% 2.68 61.84% 
Reduce margins 2.56 57.14% 2.49 53.26% 
Reduce output 1.86 23.41% 1.88 24.25% 
* Responses are scored from 1 (“not relevant”) to 4 (“very relevant”). 
 
Table 2. Percentage shares of the firms’ main cost-cutting strategies  
Cost-cutting strategy after a cost shock after a wage shock 
Reduce number of 
temporary/other employees 17.56% 19.45% 
Reduce number of 
permanent employees 10.89% 11.39% 
Reduce hours worked per 
employee 7.08% 7.79% 
Reduce flexible wage 
components 9.39% 11.58% 
Reduce base wages 1.64% --- 
Reduce non-labour costs 53.44% 49.79% 
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Table 3. Adjustment of prices and (other) costs in response to cost shocks and wage shocks, probit, 
average marginal effects 
 Cost shock Wage shock 
 Increase price Reduce costs Increase price Reduce costs 
Competition (dummy) -0.0182 0.0375*** -0.0296** 0.0292** 
 (0.0119) (0.0113) (0.0125) (0.0118) 
     
Share of foreign sales -0.0048 0.0550*** -0.0609*** 0.0458** 
 (0.0181) (0.0186) (0.0194) (0.0193) 
     
Labour share -0.103*** -0.0747*** 0.117*** -0.0492* 
 (0.0266) (0.0271) (0.0294) (0.0290) 
     
Collective agreement, higher level 0.0247* 0.0136 0.0390** 0.0066 
(dummy) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0155) (0.0151) 
     
Collective agreement, firm level -0.0046 0.0128 -0.0217* 0.0210 
(dummy) (0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0130) 
     
Share of foreign sales X Non-EA -0.0632** -0.0458 -0.0655** -0.0453 
 (0.0315) (0.0311) (0.0329) (0.0308) 
     
Labour share X Non-EA 0.0229 0.0633 0.0412 0.1140** 
 (0.0507) (0.0497) (0.0497) (0.050) 
Observations 11123 11004 10336 10010 
McFadden’s Pseudo- R² 0.088 0.080 0.097 0.149 
Log-likelihood -6572.1 -6482.3 -6309.4 -5808.3 
Observed frequency  0.650 0.661 0.592 0.574 
Predicted frequency 0.660 0.676 0.598 0.578 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
level, respectively. The regressions also include country, sector and firms’ size effects. EA=euro area. The marginal 
effects of interaction terms are averages across all observations of the Ai and Norton (2003) expressions.  
 
Table 4. Correlation between the probit coefficients of country dummies and EPL, all countries 
 Cost shock Wage shock 
Increase price 0.461* 0.269 
 (0.259) (0.363) 
Reduce costs 0.056 -0.208 
 (0.255) (0.274) 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * denote significance at the 10% significance level 
according to asymptotic and bootstrap standard errors. The country effects (coefficients associated 
with the country dummies) are obtained from the estimations described in Table 3. 
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Table 5. Cost adjustment strategies after a cost shock and some relevant covariates, probit, average 
marginal effects 
 
Permanent 
employment 
Temporary 
employment 
Flexible 
wages Hours 
Non-labour 
cost 
   
   
Competition  0.0209** 0.0158 0.0210*** -0.0008 -0.0593*** 
(dummy) (0.0089) (0.0114) (0.0068) (0.0071) (0.0149) 
 
     
Share of  -0.0182 0.0156 -0.0193* -0.0138 0.0321 
foreign sales (0.0135) (0.0166) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0229) 
 
     
Labour share 0.0279 -0.0179 0.0869*** 0.0174 -0.116*** 
 
(0.0190) (0.0253) (0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0349) 
 
     
Coll. agreement  0.0116 0.0398*** -0.0145 -0.0004 -0.0217 
higher level (0.0110) (0.0148) (0.0072) (0.0095) (0.0188) 
(dummy)   
   
Coll. agreement  0.0055 -0.0055 0.0001 -0.0031 -0.0014 
firm level  (0.0076) (0.0103) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0142) 
(dummy)   
   
Share of temp.  -0.0725*** 0.135*** -0.0321** 0.0183 -0.0598* 
employment (0.0212) (0.0234) (0.0135) (0.0147) (0.0332) 
 
     
Share of part-  0.0129 -0.0133 -0.0436** 0.0573*** 0.0014 
time empl. (0.0190) (0.0280) (0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0355) 
 
     
Share of  -0.0002 -0.0004* 0.0008*** -0.0001 -0.0003 
variable wages (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) 
 
     
Share of  0.0272 0.0125 0.0168 0.0161 -0.0395 
foreign sales (0.0208) (0.0304) (.0211) (0.0215) (0.0378) 
X Non-EA   
   
Labour share 0.0894*** -0.0079 -0.0458 -0.0175 -0.0904 
X Non-EA (0.0440) (0.0495) (.0388) (0.030) (0.0621) 
 
  
   
Observations 8037 8037 8037 8037 8037 
Log-Likelihood -2042.6 -3461.0 2337.9 -1689.0 -5276.1 
Pseudo-R2 0.0473 0.0649 0.0705 0.0522 0.0326 
Observed 
frequency  0.0791 0.1731 0.0945 0.0626 0.5762 
Predicted 
frequency 0.0684 0.1552 0.0803 0.0519 0.5763 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
level, respectively. Not reported: country, sector and firms’ size effects. EA abbreviates euro area. The marginal 
effects of interaction terms are averages across all observations of the Ai and Norton (2003) expressions.  
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Table 6. Cost adjustment strategies after a wage shock  and some relevant covariates, probit, average 
marginal effects  
 
Permanent 
employment 
Temporary 
employment 
Flexible 
wages Hours 
Non-labour 
cost 
 
  
   
Competition 
(dummy) 
0.0275*** 0.0268** 0.0232** -0.0078 -0.0734*** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0125) (0.0077) (0.0072) (0.0153) 
      
Share of foreign 
sales 
-0.0123 0.0345* 
-0.0168 -0.0169 -0.0022 
 
(0.0151) (0.0179) (0.0119) (0.0112) (0.0244) 
      
Labour share 0.0419* 0.0308 0.0814*** 0.0018 -0.142*** 
 
(0.0221) (0.0271) (0.0172) (0.0169) (0.0372) 
      
Collective 
agreement  
-0.0036 0.0352** 
-0.0250** -0.0142 -0.0012 
higher level 
(dummy) 
(0.0125) (0.0159) (0.0082) (0.0109) (0.0205) 
 
  
   
Collective 
agreement 
0.0120 0.0109 
-0.0167* -0.0016 -0.0078 
firm level (dummy) (0.0092) (0.0116) (0.0065) (0.0072) (0.0151) 
 
  
   
Share of temporary -0.0503** 0.137*** -0.0429** 0.0382** -0.0884*** 
employment (0.0220) (0.0245) (0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0338) 
      
Share of part-time 0.0066 -0.0107 -0.0382 0.0620*** 0.00876 
employment (0.0226) (0.0308) (0.0176) (0.0170) (0.0379) 
      
Share of variable  -0.00058** -0.0004 0.0012*** -0.0001 -0.0003 
wages (0.00023) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
      
Share of foreign 
sales X 
0.0183 0.0107 0.0100 0.0049 -0.0001 
non-euro area (0.0234) (0.0330) (0.0241) (0.0213) (0.0397) 
 
  
   
Labour share X 0.0790* -0.0789 -0.0097 -0.0016 -0.0752 
non-euro area (0.0469) (0.0529) (0.0440) (0.0315) (0.0631) 
 
  
   
Observations 7415 7415 7415 7415 7415 
Log-Likelihood -2194.3 -3360.7 -2441.0 -1651.8 -4942.0 
Pseudo-R2 0.0363 0.0742 0.0601 0.0524 0.0371 
Observed frequency  0.0957 0.1926 0.1118 0.0672 0.5154 
Predicted frequency 0.0866 0.1704 0.0992 0.0564 0.5149 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. Not reported: country, sector and firms’ size effects. EA abbreviates 
euro area. Changes to the marginal effects of interaction terms are averages across all observations of 
the Ai and Norton (2003) expressions. 
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Appendix 
Theoretical impact of shocks on wages and employment 
To maximise profits in a ‘right to manage’ setting employers should choose employment so as to 
equate the wage, which they take as given, to labour’s marginal impact on firm’s revenues. Formally, 
consider a log-linear schedule 
wi= -ηili+ai  
where w
 
is the log of employer labour cost, li is employment, a indexes marginal revenue, and ηi<1 is 
the elasticity of the inverse labour demand schedule. Symmetrically, let εi denote the elasticity of 
wages to employment: 
wi = εili + si . 
Solving for wages and employment, we have 
wi = [ηi/(εi+ηi)]si + [εi/(εi+ηi)]ai, 
li = (ai– si)/(εi+ηi). 
The employment impact of the wage shocks represented by ∆s in this simple framework,  
∆li = ∆si/( εi+ηi), 
 is larger when η , the elasticity of labour demand, is small. Since η is the weighted (by the cost share 
of labour) average of the constant-output elasticity of substitution and of the elasticity of revenues to 
output, it depends on the degree of decreasing returns to labour, on the elasticity of product demand, 
and on labour’s substitutability with other factors of production, which is similar relevant to responses 
to changes in the prices of factors other than labour. The equilibrium wage and employment reactions 
to those and other labour demand shocks are 
∆wi = [εi/(εi+ηi)] ∆ai,       ∆li = ∆ai/(εi+ηi) = ∆wi/εi. 
The employment response to such shocks is small when it occurs along a steeply increasing labour 
supply curve. Conversely, if wages do not change (possibly because they are set by binding 
agreements at more aggregate levels), then employment responds strongly to other cost shocks.  
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Table A.1. Summary statistics for control variables  
 Type Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Number 
of obs. 
Country:       
 AT (Austria) Dummy 0.037  0 1 15235 
 BE (Belgium) Dummy 0.094  0 1 15235 
 CZ (Czech Republic) Dummy 0.026  0 1 15235 
 EE (Estonia) Dummy 0.024  0 1 15235 
 ES (Spain) Dummy 0.120  0 1 15235 
 FR (France) Dummy 0.133  0 1 15235 
 HU (Hungary) Dummy 0.132  0 1 15235 
 IE (Ireland) Dummy 0.065  0 1 15235 
 IT (Italy) Dummy 0.063  0 1 15235 
 LT (Lithuania) Dummy 0.023  0 1 15235 
 NL (Netherlands) Dummy 0.070  0 1 15235 
 PL (Poland) Dummy 0.076  0 1 15235 
 PT (Portugal) Dummy 0.094  0 1 15235 
 SI (Slovenia) Dummy 0.044  0 1 15235 
Sector:       
 Manufacturing Dummy 0.399  0 1 15171 
 Energy Dummy 0.012  0 1 15171 
 Construction Dummy 0.076  0 1 15171 
 Trade Dummy 0.204  0 1 15171 
 Market services Dummy 0.272  0 1 15171 
 Financial intermediaries Dummy 0.024  0 1 15171 
 Non-market services  Dummy 0.013  0 1 15171 
Employment size:       
 5-19 Dummy 0.260  0 1 14972 
 20-49 Dummy 0.224  0 1 14972 
 50-199  Dummy 0.304  0 1 14972 
 200+  Dummy 0.212  0 1 14972 
Competition  Dummy 0.164  0 1 14139 
Share of foreign sales Fraction 0.193 0.308 0 1 13810 
Labour share  Fraction 0.339 0.201 0.001 1 13615 
Collective agreement, higher level Dummy 0.597  0 1 15099 
Collective agreement, firm level  Dummy 0.243  0 1 15026 
EPL for permanent workers Index, 0-5 2.442 0.734 1.603 4.167 13860 
Share of part-time employment Fraction  0.094 0.180 0 1 15021 
Share of temporary employment Fraction 0.094 0.184 0 1 14991 
Share of variable wages Fraction 0.120 0.191 0 1 13277 
 
